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Abstract
Boys and girls in India experience large differences in survival and health outcomes. For
example, the 2001 Census reports that the sex ratio for children under six years of age is
927 girls per thousand boys, an outcome that has been attributed to differences in parents’
behavior towards their sons and daughters. Most studies rely primarily on cultural fac-
tors or biases in economic returns to explain these differences. In this paper, I propose an
explanation where bequest motives drive fertility behavior that generates sex-based differ-
ences in outcomes even when parents do not explicitly prefer boys over girls. In India’s
patrilocal rural society, women do not inherit property and heads of joint families aim to
retain assets within the family lineage for future generations. I hypothesize that this leads
heads to bequeath more land to claimants with more sons, in turn generating a race for
sons among adult brothers seeking to maximize their inheritance of agricultural land. I
confirm this theoretical prediction using panel data from rural households in India. This
strategic fertility behavior implies that girls have systematically more siblings compared to
boys, and hence receive smaller shares of household resources, offering an explanation for
sex-based differences in outcomes.
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1 Introduction
To my brother belong your green fields
O father, while I am banished afar. . .
– Hindi folksong
Boys and girls in India experience large differences in survival and health outcomes. The
2001 Census reports that the sex ratio for children under six years of age is 927 girls per thou-
sand boys, one of largest differences in survival outcomes in the developing world. Among
surviving children, boys are more likely than girls to receive immunizations, medical attention
and adequate nutrition (Pande 2003). An extensive literature has addressed these persistent
gender differences, identifying various motivations such as differential returns in the labor mar-
ket (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982) and asymmetrical preferences due to culture or tradition
(Sen 1990). However, these explanations do not adequately address many stylized facts about
the distribution and nature of health and mortality differences. In this paper, I show that be-
quests and associated fertility behavior in an agricultural society can be a significant driver of
differential health and survival outcomes for boys and girls, even when parents do not treat
daughters and sons differently.
Much of the existing literature suggests that economic or cultural considerations lead to
discriminatory behavior by parents. The specific behaviors influencing gender differences in
survival and health outcomes include abortion if pre-natal diagnostic testing reveals the foetus
is female, infanticide if the newborn is a girl, and discrimination in the allocation of food and
medical care in favor of boys throughout infancy and childhood. Policy responses have there-
fore sought to directly address these actions. In 1994, the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act
regulated the use of ultrasound machines and banned the use of “techniques for the purpose
of pre-natal sex determination leading to female foeticide”. State governments in Delhi and
Haryana launched the “Ladli” scheme offering payments to low-income parents whose daugh-
ters survive childhood and achieve certain educational targets. Under the “Palna” scheme, the
central government established “Cradle Baby Reception Centres” in each district where parents
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could leave unwanted girls for either future adoption or rearing in state-run orphanages.
We know that existing explanations are incomplete, and the policy responses inadequate,
because the estimated number of excess female deaths due to foeticide or infanticide do not
account for the observed sex ratio (Dreze and Sen 2002). In addition, explanations that rely
solely on discrimination in the labor market or cultural practices fail many tests. Census and
National Sample Survey data shows the sex ratio is worse in Indian states where land forms a
large part of family assets (Figure 1) and where income from agriculture is high (Figure 2). If
economic considerations drive discriminatory behavior, why are outcomes for girls relatively
worse in prosperous regions? Also, household level data investigated in this paper indicates
that the sex ratio is also worse in large “joint” families, which predominate in rural farming
communities. Why is this so, when larger families would arguably provide greater economic
security compared to independent families? Finally, if land ownership indicates greater eco-
nomic capability, why do we observe worse survival outcomes for girls among land owning
households?
I address these questions in a model of bequest and fertility behavior among rural, land-
owning families in a patrilocal society. Almost universally in India, adult daughters leave their
natal family at the time of marriage to join their husband’s family and do not inherit land from
their fathers. The joint family head divides the land bequest among the remaining claimants,
who are his adult sons. In so doing, the head is motivated by a desire to retain land within the
family line carried through by his male descendants. If a head has only daughters, then the
land passes from the head’s family to the daughter’s husband’s family and leaves the lineage.
Thus, the household head makes land bequest decisions after observing the number of sons
that claimants have, since bequeathing land to a claimant with many daughters and few sons
increases the probability that land will eventually leave the lineage. The claimants anticipate
the head’s preferences and simultaneously make fertility choices to maximize their expected
inheritance, taking into account expectations of other claimants’ fertility choices. Even when
indifferent between boys and girls, each claimant has greater incentive to have more children
when the other claimants have more boys, a prediction I term “strategic fertility”. An impli-
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cation of this fertility pattern is that the average girl in a joint family has more siblings than
the average boy, which has been shown to lead to worse health and survival outcomes even
when parents’ total resources are same and they do not discriminate between their sons and
daughters.
This novel hypothesis for the origin of gender differences in India relies on the nature of
norms and institutions associated with land management, marriage and fertility choices. The
bequest and fertility behavior as well as the demographic implications of the hypothesis are
tested using a nationally representative panel dataset of rural households in India. The results
confirm that household heads bequeath a larger share of the land to claimants with more sons.
In response, claimants in joint families increase fertility in a race for boys motivated by a desire
to increase their inheritance. Specifically, I demonstrate that an additional son among the other
claimants in the joint family increases the probability that a claimant will report a pregnancy
by 0.8 percent per year. This result are robust to two tests. First, this fertility response is
significant if the joint family head owns land, but not otherwise, suggesting that land bequests
are motivating strategic fertility. Second, other claimants have an impact on fertility while the
head is alive and the land has not yet been distributed, but not after the head’s death.
As a result of strategic fertility behavior, the average girl who is born in a joint family
with two or more claimants has nearly twice as many excess siblings compared to the average
girl who is born in a multigenerational family with a single claimant. These results suggest a
large, but as yet unexamined role for household structure in explaining fertility behavior and
poorer outcomes for girls. Thus, this paper contributes to an emerging literature that recognizes
the different forms of non-unitary households and family structures observed in developing
countries. The joint family literature in particular is sparse, and this paper is one of few papers
that incorporates inter and intra-generational dynamics within such families (see Rosenzweig
and Wolpin 1985, Foster and Rosenzweig 2002, Joshi and Sinha 2003, Edlund and Rahman
2005).
This paper also adds to the literature on strategic bequest behavior inaugurated by Bern-
heim, Schleifer, and Summers (1985). Since land bequests form a major share of wealth acqui-
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sition in agricultural societies, this framework is particularly useful in understanding behavior
in families in rural India. With agricultural land bequests driving differential fertility behavior,
Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers (1985) would suggest that sex differences would increase
with the value of land, although this effect might be mitigated by the shift away from farming
to other professions.
Strategic fertility behavior poses several challenges for policy-makers aiming to alleviate
poorer outcomes for girls in developing countries. The institution of joint families and associ-
ated practices remain entrenched in rural society despite efforts to withdraw legal recognition
to such family structures. Also, unlike overt acts of sex-selective foeticide and infanticide,
individual instances of bequest-motivated differential fertility stopping behavior are arguably
difficult to detect or prevent.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the social context of sex
discrimination among agricultural households in rural India. Section 3 develops a theoreti-
cal model of bequest and fertility behavior in joint families and proposes testable hypotheses.
Sections 4 and 5 describe the data, econometric tests and results. Section 6 concludes with
discussion of the results.
2 Social context
2.1 Three discrimination puzzles
The reasons for sex differentials in child health and mortality in developing countries remain a
puzzle. In their seminal contribution, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) propose that sex bias is a
rational response to differences in economic returns to men and women. These wage differences
cause a sex bias both in labor market participation as well as in parents’ investments in their
children’s health and education (Sen and Sengupta 1983).
Misogynistic social and cultural beliefs may also drive male preference (Sen 1990). Gan-
gadharan and Maitra (2003) examine sex bias among different racial and ethnic groups in South
Africa and find that sex bias is stronger in the Indian community than in any other group, per-
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haps due to religious beliefs that privilege men over women.
In both these frameworks, the authors argue that parents actively discriminate in favor of
boys and against girls through sex-selective foeticide and infanticide, as well as differences in
provision of food and healthcare. Popular reporting reinforces this perspective (Dugger 2001;
Katz 2006). However, recent analysis has challenged this view. Demographic analysis using the
National Family Health Survey 1992 reveals that sex selective foeticide or infanticide cannot be
the dominant factor explaining the skewed sex ratio (Bhargava 2003). Most excess male deaths
take place during birth or soon after,1 whereas most excess female deaths take place between 7
and 36 months, even after accounting for severe underreporting and misreporting of foeticides
and infanticides. Furthermore, analysis of sex-selective abortion by Arnold, Kishor, and Roy
(2002) and Bhat and Zavier (2007) estimate at best 100,000 such abortions per year, which is
insufficient in explaining a gender survival gap of tens of millions. Hence, neglect of infant
girls seems to be the main driver of the differences in health and survival outcomes.
The evidence is mixed on whether such neglect represents willful or inadvertent discrim-
ination by parents. A number of older papers argue that parents actively discriminate against
daughters in allocating nutrition and health resource (see Das Gupta 1987 and the extensive
literature cited in Miller 1981). However, tests of intrahousehold allocation fail to reveal sig-
nificant bias in behavior. Griffiths, Matthews, and Hinde (2002) reject significant within-family
differences in weight by gender.2 Instead, recent studies present evidence that son-preference
manifests itself predominantly in fertility behavior so that the resulting family structure is un-
favorable to girls (Basu 1989; Arnold, Choe, and Roy 1998). This fertility behavior takes the
form of “stopping rules” where parents have children until they have a certain number of boys
are born (Yamaguchi 1989; Clark 2000). Under such rules, the average girl will have systemat-
ically more siblings than the average boy, leading to fewer resources and poorer outcomes even
with equitable parent behavior. The evidence suggests that stopping rules have significant im-
pact on differential outcomes for girls compared to boys (Basu and de Jong 2008; Rosenblum
1This is consistent with the medical evidence that the male foetus is much more vulnerable than a female foetus
(Gloster and Williams 1992, Andersson and Bergstrom 1998, Andersen et al. 2002).
2Also see Jensen 2003 for a list of more such studies.
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2008). The origin of these stopping rules is not sufficiently addressed by the literature and is
the first puzzle that I will address in this paper.
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) argue that discrimination against girls is driven by asym-
metry in the economic or social marketplace, which would suggest that the worst outcomes
should be observed in the most destitute families where the marginal value of an additional son
is greatest. However, Mahajan and Tarozzi (2007) report that gender differences in nutrition
and health outcomes increased in the 1990s, a period of rapid economic growth. Das Gupta
(1987) and more recently Chakraborty and Kim (2008) find that the difference between girls
and boys is greater in middle class and higher caste households compared to lower class and
lower caste households. These contradictory findings constitute the second puzzle addressed in
this paper.
Girls experience worse outcomes in large, multi-generational families known as joint fam-
ilies. In the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS 1999), the child sex ratio was
0.816 girls per boy in joint families compared to 0.912 girls otherwise. Why this would be is
not clear, especially since recent research has shown that children in joint families benefit from
higher levels of public good provision (Edlund and Rahman 2005). A possible explanation is
that co-resident grandparents transmit traditional ideas on gender roles. George (1997) sug-
gests an active role for the paternal grandmother in performing infanticide. Exactly what these
traditional ideas are, why grandparents would believe them, or what motivates grandmothers
to perform such gruesome acts is left unanswered. In this paper, the question of why girls’
outcomes are comparatively worse in joint families constitutes the third puzzle.
Thus, current explanations for sex discrimination paint at best an incomplete picture, with
many assumptions that do not incorporate the nuances of different family structures and social
practices in India. This paper offers a new explanation for gender discrimination that specifi-
cally addresses the three puzzles outlined above.
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2.2 Rural family structure
The family is the central unit of social organization, production and consumption in most agrar-
ian societies. Much of the development literature treats the “family” as synonymous with the
“household” and takes the unitary household as the basis for analysis (see Deaton 1997 for a
summary). However, recent surveys that track household formation, splitting and dissolution
allow researchers to explore more complicated family structures in developing societies.
Caldwell’s (1984) basic framework sheds light on various family structures in India. A
“nuclear family” is formed when a couple leaves their parents’ home upon marriage to form
a household with their unmarried, typically minor, children.3 In a “stem family”, two married
couples cohabit in a household together. The younger husband is the son of the older couple.
Finally, a “joint-stem family” refers to a family where an older patriarch and his wife live with
two or more adult children, along with their wives and minor children.4 The nuclear family has
been the dominant type of family organization in much of the world, except China and North
India where joint families are widely observed (Das Gupta 1999).
A widespread social practice in India is that women leave their natal household at the time of
marriage and move to their husband’s home. As a result of such “patrilocality” or “virilocality”,
women are considered members only of their family of marriage. Consequently, they have no
inheritance rights in their parents’ family, neither in law nor in practice since any land given to
them would be lost to the family lineage (Agarwal 1998; Mearns 1999; Singh 2005).
Botticini and Siow (2003) show why in patrilocal societies, the family head prefers to leave
a bequest of illiquid land only to his sons. Adult sons remain at home throughout their lives
and work on the family’s land. If assets are distributed to all children at the time of the head’s
death, sons and daughters have different incentives to exert effort on farm production. The
non-resident daughters’ effort on the parents’ farm is unobservable and they might shirk. Sons
would not obtain complete rewards from their effort resulting in a free-riding problem with
daughters benefiting disproportionately compared to their effort. Hence, they argue, the poten-
3In this paper, I use “independent family” instead
4In this paper, I use “joint family” as a shorthand for a joint-stem family
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tial for free-riding explains why daughters receive their share of the bequest as dowries in the
form of liquid assets at the time of marriage, rather than in the form of fixed productive assets
at the time of the head’s death. Chen (2000) offers empirical confirmation for Botticini and
Siow’s (2003) hypothesis, reporting that only 13 percent of daughters inherited land after the
death of their land-owning fathers.
The farm-based joint family is of particular interest since presumably the demands of agri-
cultural production gave rise to such a structure. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) develop a
model where older family members learn how to farm a specific piece of land and transfer
this knowledge to their children. This means that using family labor is relatively profitable
compared to hired labor. Older and younger family members enter into an implicit contract
where the elderly transfer land-specific knowledge to younger family members in return for
co-residence. Thus, the model explains both the formation of stem and joint families, as well
as the paucity of land sales to non-family members. Land sales occur only in case of extreme
distress, particularly weather shocks.5 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) report that sales of agri-
cultural land are rare in rural India – only 1.75% of all families and 0.39% of stem and joint
families in their sample reported any land sales in a year.6
Sharing in the consumption of a household public good as well as the possibility of receiv-
ing a share in the bequest upon the head’s death keeps the sons from splitting away to form
their own households. Land is the dominant form of bequest; indeed Das Gupta (1999) reports
that the raison d’etre of joint family households is to ensure the continuity of the estate.
Why is land preservation so important in an agricultural society, particularly compared to
more liquid assets such as cash, or those that are more directly consumed such as livestock?
Various studies propose answers to this question. Land is a fixed, immovable asset that cannot
be lost or stolen. Thus, unlike wage employment, land offers a source of permanent income
5This explanation for household division is confirmed by Foster and Rosenzweig (2002), who present a model
of a farm-based joint family that examines closely the role of public goods as incentives for claimants to remain
within the family. When economic distress due to weather shocks or other family-wide factors reduces the provi-
sion of household public goods, more couples leave the joint family’s household to set up separate households. In
addition, household division increases due to claimant inequality in birth order, schooling and the number of sons,
but not the number of daughters.
6Also see Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan (2007) for more on rural land market participation in India.
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either through sale or direct consumption of the produce. This has important consequences in a
society with little formal social insurance. For example, Rose (1999) reports that controlling for
size of asset holdings, child survival outcomes are significantly better in land owning families.
Additionally, farmers who cultivate their own land do not face classic agency problems and
are motivated to exert maximum effort into production (Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak 2002).
The advantages of land compared to other types of assets are recognized by other agents in the
village economy. For example, Feder and Onchan (1987) show that land ownership improves
access to credit, even if it not directly linked to farm investments.
These reasons suggest that well-being of the lineage is symbiotic with preservation of land.
Indeed, in a pioneering study of Indian villages, Srinivas (1976) wrote
A man was acquiring land not only for himself but for his descendants. . . while
a man may have had his descendants in mind when buying land he also knew it
would be divided after his death. . . but even worse than division of land among
descendants was not having any. That meant the end of the lineage, a disaster
which no one liked even to contemplate.
Thus, land possession, control and preservation is a significant factor influencing behavior
within rural families. With land sales rare, most families obtain land through inheritance. Al-
though the Hindu Succession Act (1956) specifies that land should be divided equally among
surviving sons, the law can be circumvented by a will that expresses the head’s preferences.
Hence, equal division is neither the norm nor the law, and adult sons have incentive to alter
their behavior to get larger shares of land. I use these features of family behavior to explain the
three sex discrimination puzzles presented in Section 2.1 – why are gender differences larger
in land-owning families, why is the sex ratio worse in joint families, and how do stopping rules
arise in fertility behavior?
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3 Theory
In Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers (1985), parents use bequests to induce children to bring
their behavior in line with the parents’ preferences. The formulation in this section makes two
basic assumptions while adapting that model to the case of farm-based societies in developing
countries. First, for reasons outlined earlier, land sales do not occur, so parents do not have
the option of selling land and consuming or bequeathing the proceeds. Second, adult daughters
leave the household upon marriage to live with their husband’s family whereas adult sons may
continue to live with or near the parents. In this section, I examine what these two assumptions
imply about the household head’s bequest and children’s fertility behavior. I illustrate how
fertility behavior leads to systematic differences in the types of households that girls and boys
live in, and how this explains the sex discrimination puzzle. The modeling exercise yields
theoretical predictions that can be tested in the data.7
I interpret the result from Botticini and Siow (2003) as an explanation for why the head
prefers to bequeath land to claimants with more sons in order to perpetuate land ownership
within the same lineage. If the head bequeaths any land to claimants with only daughters,
then that land will leave the family. More land to claimants with more sons implies a greater
probability of not having all daughters in the subsequent generation.
As an illustration, consider the case of a head who has to choose between two claimants,
the first with a boy and a girl and the second with two boys. If the grandsons further have two
children each after the head dies, then the probability that the first claimant has at least one
grandson and land remains within the family is 3/4, whereas the probability that the second
claimant has at least one grandson and land remains within the family is 15/16. The head
derives additional utility from bequeathing a share of his assets to each claimant, but realizes
declining marginal gains from doing so. Suppose u(κ) = pi
√
κ, where pi is the probability
7The model presented in this section illustrates the essential mechanism of bequest, public good consumption
and fertility behavior. To estimate the structural parameters, a joint family model would also incorporate farm
production, labor supply, consumption, savings, marriage and residence decisions. The empirical tests in this
paper show that residence decisions do not significantly affect bequest or fertility behavior. Modeling and testing
other aspects of household decisions await panel datasets that comprehensively measure individual consumption
within the family, along with other decisions.
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that a claimant has at least one grandson and κ is the fraction of the land bequeathed to the
first claimant. Then he maximizes the expected utility from bequests by solving the following
problem.
max
κ
3
4
√
κ +
15
16
√
1 − κ such that 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 (1)
The solution to the head’s problem is κ = 16/41 and 1 − κ = 25/41 and the claimant with two
sons receives a larger share of the bequest.
3.1 Model of fertility choice
This section presents a formal model of bequest with endogenous fertility behavior in joint
families. The objective of the modelling exercise is to develop a mechanism that links land
bequests with fertility behavior, and its influence on health and survival outcomes for girls.
The theoretical model generates clear predictions that will be tested empirically in subsequent
sections.
The family patriarch is the head of the joint family. The head’s adult sons are claimants to
the family public and private goods while the head is alive, and to the family land once the head
is dead. Allocations to each claimant are based on the claimant’s family structure. In each pe-
riod, claimants choose whether to try to have a child or not. Claimants choose the best strategy
to maximize their payoff, given the choices made by all other claimants. Heads then observe
the claimants’ family structure and fertility decisions and make bequest and consumption allo-
cation decisions that maximize their objective function. Assuming no information constraints
within the joint family, claimants work recursively to solve the head’s problem. Fertility is thus
endogenous to bequest and consumption shares.
Consider a single period problem of a family with a head H and claimants indexed by
i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. The number of sons and daughters that claimant i has is ni = {mi, fi}. The
number of boys and girls for all claimants at any point can be written as
m′ = [m1 . . .mN] and f′ = [ f1 . . . fN]
Let {m0, f0} represent the number of boys and girls for all claimants at the beginning of a period.
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φi ∈ {0, 1} represents claimant i’s fertility decision in the period, where φi = 1 if the claimant
reports a pregnancy and 0 otherwise. The fertility decisions made by the set of all claimants is
φ′ = [φ1 . . . φN]
In this model, the family head determines the bequest share and intrahousehold allocation
of private consumption goods for all claimants, as well as the household public good z. The
bequest share (κ) and consumption allocation (µ) can be written as follows:
κ = [κ1 . . . κN] and µ = [µ1 . . . µN]
where κi ≥ 0 , µi ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0 for all i (2)
and
∑
i
κi = 1 ,
∑
i
µi = 1 , z +
∑
i
µixi = I (3)
The head’s objective is to maximize the utility from bequests, which consists of the proba-
bility that land stays within the lineage, as well as a direct utility from bequest. The claimant’s
objective is to maximize his consumption, given the preferences of the head and the other
claimants. To understand the dynamics of these decisions, consider the following sequence of
events.
1. Each claimant observes {m0, f0}, with preferences well known within the joint family. He
decides whether to try to have a child or not (φi).
2. The head observes {m0, f0} and the fertility decision (φ), but not the outcome, for all
claimants. He decides the land allocation (κ) as if he were to die in the current period, as
well as the consumption allocation (µ) and the amount of public good (z).
3. The head and all claimants observe outcomes {m, f} from claimants’ fertility decisions,
as well as whether the head survives. At the end of the period, they realize utility payoffs
based on their decisions.
This sequence of events implies that claimants anticipate the head’s decisions and re-
spond accordingly. In the two-stage game, I solve the head’s problem first, then determine
the claimants’ reaction functions to the head’s decision.
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The head’s total utility depends on the utility uH() from giving to each claimant. Therefore,
the head’s problem can be written succinctly as:
max
κ,µ,z
UH =
∑
i
uH(pii, κi, µi, z) (4)
where z is the household public good, κi is claimant i’s bequest share and µi is claimant i’s
consumption allocation. pii = pi(mi) is the probability that land bequeathed to claimant i stays
within the family lineage such that
∂pii
∂mi
> 0 and pii(m0i ) > 0 for all m
0
i (5)
{mi, fi} is the outcome of the claimant’s fertility decision. This formulation assumes that the
head draws direct utility from the act of dividing bequests and consumption allocations among
various claimants. He also draws utility from his own consumption of a household public good.
The maximization problem is subject to the constraints listed in (2). Solving the problem for
all claimants yields the following reaction functions.
κi = κ(m) (6)
µi = µ(m) (7)
z = z(m) (8)
The head’s preference for bequeathing larger shares of land to claimants with more sons can be
written as,
∂κi
∂mi
≥ 0, ∂κi
∂m−i
≤ 0 (9)
I term the comparative static in (9) as “strategic bequests”. I test for this relationship in the
data, which if confirmed, provides the motivation for claimants to have more sons than their
brothers.8
8One concern might be that the head will decide to grant a larger share of the household consumption goods
to claimants who have fewer sons, counter to the result in equation (9). In Appendix A, I show that the qualitative
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The claimant’s expected utility depends on his consumption at the end of the period. Thus,
the claimant’s objective can be written as
max
φi
EUi(xi, xδi ,ni) (10)
where expectations are taken over the probability that the head survives in the current period.
xi = xi(n, µ, z) is consumption if the head survives and xδi = x
δ
i (n, κ) is the consumption if he
dies. In both cases, consumption depends on the number of children the claimant has, since
more children are a cost for the claimant. Before the head’s death, the claimant’s consumption
also depends on his share of the household’s private (µ) and public resources (z). After the
head’s death, a claimant’s consumption depends on the agricultural output from inherited land
(κ). In addition, the claimant draws direct utility from his children (ni).9
In this specification, fertility choice φi does not enter directly into the claimant’s utility
function. To understand how φi influences ni, consider that a claimant cannot be sure of the
outcome of his fertility decision. He might have a child when he does not want to and might
not have a child when he does. The outcome from a fertility decision is
mi = m0i + I{y˜ < p}φi + ˜φ,m
0
i (11)
fi = f 0i + I{y˜ > p}φi + ˜φ, f
0
i (12)
where y˜ is a continuous random variable with distribution U[0, 1] and p is the exogenous prob-
ability of having a boy. y˜ < p implies that I{y˜ < p} = 1 and the claimant has another boy if
φi = 1. Conversely, y˜ > p implies that I{y˜ > p} = 1 and the claimant has a girl if φi = 1.
˜
φ,m0
i ∈ {0, 1} is a discrete fertility shock whose distribution depends on φi and m0i . Similarly,
the distribution of ˜φ, f
0
i ∈ {0, 1} depends on φi and f 0i . ˜i = −1 can represent the loss of a child
when no pregnancy is reported, or a still birth when one is. ˜i = 0 implies that the claimant has
impact of more sons on the claimant’s share of consumption goods is the same as the impact on the bequest share.
9The claimant can draw utility from current consumption while foreseeing his future role as a household head
if his comprehensive utility consists of two separable parts - utility from consumption as a claimant and utility
from bequests as a head.
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a child if desired. With ˜i = 1 and φi = 1, twins are born when the claimant reports a pregnancy.
Plugging in the head’s reaction functions into all the claimants’ problems yields the follow-
ing solution.
φ∗i = φi(m
0) (13)
φ∗−i = φ−i(m
0) (14)
In order to characterize this solution, I impose further restrictions on the preferences claimants’
and head’s preferences in the next section.
3.2 Impact of fertility on family structure
Strategic bequests that lead to more pregnancies do not by themselves imply unequal gender-
based outcomes. This section illustrates the demographic implications of strategic bequests
over time on the differences in resource allocation between sons and daughters. I link endoge-
nous fertility behavior with poorer outcomes for girls in joint families, even when claimants
themselves do not have a preference for boys over girls. To do so, I make some standard as-
sumptions on the form of the head’s and claimants’ utility functions. Assume that the head
exhibits declining marginal utility in the bequest share to each claimant and the claimants ex-
hibit declining marginal utility in consumption. These assumptions help to characterize the
solution presented in equations (13) and (14).
∂UH
∂κi
≥ 0, ∂
2UH
∂κ2i
< 0,
∂Ui
∂xi
≥ 0, ∂
2Ui
∂x2i
< 0 (15)
where x represents the claimant’s consumption of household goods as well as children. I
further assume that there exist mˆi and fˆi such that the marginal utility of an additional child is
negative. These conditions are important to rule out situations where a claimant always gains
from having an additional child. Thus, given declining benefits from an additional child, a
claimant will be observed to have higher probability of trying for another child the fewer sons
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he already has, or the more sons the other claimants have.
Pr{φi = 1 | m0i ,m0−i} > Pr{φi = 1 | m0i + 1,m0−i} (16)
Pr{φi = 1 | m0i ,m0−i + 1} > Pr{φi = 1 | m0i ,m0−i} (17)
I term the theoretical prediction in equation (17) “strategic fertility”. Given this result,
suppose two claimants, A and B, with the same initial number of sons and daughters (m0A =
m0B, f
0
A = f
0
B) have a son and a daughter (mA = m
0
A + 1 and fB = f
0
B + 1), respectively. Then the
results in (16) and (17) imply that B, who has a new daughter, has greater incentive than A to
have another child.
Pr{φB = 1 | mA,mB} > Pr{φA = 1 | mA,mB} (18)
Without loss of generality, I assume that m0A = m
0
B = 0 and f
0
A = f
0
B = 0 and that the probability
of a pregnancy resulting in a son or daughter is 1/2. Then
No. of siblings for average girl =
1
2 Pr{φA = 1} + 32 Pr{φB = 1}
1 + 12 Pr{φA = 1} + 12 Pr{φB = 1}
(19)
No. of siblings for average boy =
3
2 Pr{φA = 1} + 12 Pr{φB = 1}
1 + 12 Pr{φA = 1} + 12 Pr{φB = 1}
(20)
No. of siblings for average girl
No. of siblings for average boy
=
1
2 Pr{φA = 1} + 32 Pr{φB = 1}
3
2 Pr{φA = 1} + 12 Pr{φB = 1}
> 1 (21)
Similarly, the impact of strategic fertility will imply that the average girl will be observed to
have more siblings than the average boy in the aggregate data.
E(No. of siblings for average girl) > E(No. of siblings for average boy) (22)
As a result, the average girl will have systematically more siblings than the average boy to
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share her resources. This means that the average household resources available to her will be
lower even if families are otherwise the same. Therefore, even if a claimant does not discrim-
inate among his children on the basis of gender, the average girl will receive fewer resources
than the average boy, and realize poorer health and survival outcomes.
4 Rural Economic and Demographic Survey
Testing the theoretical predictions presented in Section 3 requires panel or retrospective data
that records land inheritance, family structure and fertility decisions as well as other factors
that impact inheritance and fertility decisions. The National Council for Applied Economic
Research (NCAER) administered the Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS) in 1970-71 to
4,527 households in 259 villages selected from 16 major states of India. Following up on
ARIS, NCAER conducted the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) among the
same households in 1981-82 and 1998-99 (Foster and Rosenzweig 2003). The first wave of
REDS in 1981-82 surveyed 250 villages and 4,979 households, excluding nine villages in the
state of Assam from the ARIS sample due to a violent insurgency. The second wave of REDS
in 1998-99 surveyed 7,474 households consisting of surviving households from the 1981-82
wave, separated households residing in the same village and households from 1970-71 that
were missing from the 1981-82 wave. In 1998-99, the REDS sample did not include eight
villages that were located in Jammu and Kashmir, where a violent separatist movement perhaps
made the survey difficult.10
I use data from the 1998-99 wave to test the theory presented in Section 3. Previous waves
are used to categorize households as either joint, stem or independent families. I will test the
theoretical model using the sample of joint families, while using stem families as a comparison
set. Thus, households that were added into the survey for the first time in 1998-99 must be
10Since the separatist movements in Assam or Jammu and Kashmir are unlikely to be related to family dynam-
ics, I am not concerned about the missing villages as a source of non-random attrition in the sample. A common
source of non-random attrition in panel surveys is from changing household composition due to splitting. The
REDS survey tracks split-off family members who were part of the original household in either 1970-71 or 1981-
82 and continue to live in the same village, and therefore changing household composition is not a source of bias
in the sample.
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excluded since I cannot determine whether they have been independent since 1981, or are split
off members from a joint family household. This leaves 6,203 unique households in 1998-99
originating from 4,026 randomly selected households in the 1981-82 survey.
The survey was administered to three groups of respondents – the household head, every
woman in the household between age 15 and 49, and the village head or administrative officer.
Household heads answered the economic questionnaire on household migration, formation,
division and current structure. They reported why the household split away from the previous
household, which is important to determine whether that household is independent or part of
a larger joint family. The heads also provided detailed information on the source, value and
extent of their land holdings, which allowed me to observe how the inheritance was divided by
the previous household head.
Women in the household between age 15 and 49 answered the demographic questionnaire
on pregnancy history, details on each birth, and knowledge and use of contraception. Married
women were linked to their husbands who are either family heads or claimants.
In both the head and women’s survey, since respondents report dates associated with events
such as births, deaths and household division, I recover an annual retrospective panel dataset
from a single wave of observations in 1998-99. An important feature of the dataset is a detailed
fertility history for each woman that records whether or not the claimant reported a pregnancy
in every period and the number of living children in that period. Thus, even though the REDS
data is not collected annually, it has sufficient historical data for estimating a regression model.
Using the 1998-99 wave of the REDS survey, I construct two datasets. The first is a “bequest
dataset” that contains information on the bequests of land received by 1999 heads from their
fathers upon the father’s death, and is used to test for strategic bequests (equation 9). The
second is a “fertility dataset” that contains information on the fertility choices made by the
1999 claimants when the head is still alive, and is used to test for strategic fertility (equation
17).
Figure 3 shows four generations of a joint family. The bequest dataset contains the first gen-
eration as the head, and the second generation as claimants. The fertility dataset is constructed
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using the second generation as the head, and the third generation as claimants. This configu-
ration allows me to test, using the same families, the implications on the previous generation’s
bequest behavior on the subsequent generation’s fertility behavior.
Specific features of these two datasets are described in the next section that tests for strategic
bequest and strategic fertility behavior. I then analyze whether the number of excess siblings
for girls compared to boys in joint families exceeds the number in stem families.
5 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model of strategic bequests predicts a differential impact of bequest behavior on
survival and health outcomes for girls compared to boys. Hence, the econometric exercise has
three objectives. The first objective is to confirm the strategic bequest motive of equation (9),
particularly whether the claimant’s share of a bequest is influenced positively by the number of
sons. This establishes the value of sons to claimants in the bequest game. Strategic allocations
of household public and private consumption goods are not tested since these are not observed
in the REDS data. The second objective is to test strategic fertility behavior predicted in equa-
tion (17), i.e., whether a claimant’s fertility in a joint family is impacted by the number of boys
and girls that the other claimants have. The third objective is to calculate the number of siblings
born to girls and boys in joint families, and compare this to outcomes in stem families where
there is no bequest game. Note that I do not estimate the impact of strategic fertility on actual
survival or health outcomes.
To test the strategic fertility hypothesis, I propose three tests. First, “within-family fertility”
tests the strategic fertility hypothesis directly for all claimants and families. Second, “land
ownership” tests the impact of land ownership by the head on strategic fertility. Finally, “head’s
death” tests the impact of the head’s death on strategic fertility.
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5.1 Strategic bequests
5.1.1 Data
The bequest dataset contains cross-sectional snapshot of the family at the time of the head’s
death. It consists of those land-owning families that were part of a single land-owning house-
hold in 1981-82, but had split into at least two households by 1998 following the head’s death
in the interim.11 Using the demographic questionnaire, I construct a complete fertility history
between waves and calculate the number of sons and daughters for each claimant at the time of
the head’s death.
Table 1 contains summary statistics from the bequests dataset. The bequest dataset contains
1,266 claimants from 464 heads, with 2.73 claimants per head. Data on the head’s characteris-
tics is sparse because all heads had died by the time of the 1998-99 wave and were not directly
surveyed. The average size of land inheritance is 1.50 hectares per claimant.12 Note that each
claimant has, on average, 1.1 sons but only 0.9 daughters.
5.1.2 Specification
A test for strategic bequest behavior examines how the share of a claimant inheritance (κi j)
varies with the number of sons and daughters (nij) that claimant i in family j has at the time
of the head’s death, compared to the sum of the other claimants’ sons and daughters (
∑
k,i
nkj).
The bequest share κi j is censored below 0 and above 1. Therefore, I specify the following
dual-censored tobit model.
κi j =

0 if κ∗i j ≤ 0
κ∗i j if 0 < κ
∗
i j < 1
1 if 1 ≤ κ∗i j
(23)
11Note that the dataset does not report intended bequest shares while the head is still alive, only the actual shares
once he dies. This might create bias if heads’ preferences change systematically as they get older. However, if the
head’s primary objective is to preserve lineage, or if future change in preferences is anticipated by claimants, then
I expect this bias to be small.
12These land holdings are consistent with the national average holding of 1.67 hectares in 1981-82, 1.34 hectares
in 1991-92 and 1.06 hectares in 2002-03 reported in Govt. of India (2006)
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Here, κ∗i j is a latent variable such that
κ∗i j = α0 + α1nij + α2
∑
k,i
nkj + α3nij ∗ ri j + α4ri j ∗
∑
k,i
nkj + α5Xij + α6Yj + ξi j (24)
where ni = [mi fi]′, α1 = [α1m α1 f ], α2 = [α2m α2 f ], α3 = [α3m α3 f ] and α4 = [α4m α4 f ]
To confirm the strategic bequest hypothesis, I expect that the bequest share rises in the number
of own sons (α1m > 0) and falls in the number of other claimants’ sons (α2m < 0) corresponding
to the theoretical predictions in equation (9). The coefficients on two interaction terms nij ∗ ri j
and
∑
k,i
nkj ∗ri j indicate the marginal impact of the number of sons and daughters for a claimant
who has moved away from the head’s household. The impact of moving away is theoretically
ambiguous because splitting from the head’s household might indicate that the claimant has
been disinherited and is no longer a part of the bequest game, or that the claimant is already
in a strong position, irrespective of the number of sons, to receive a significant share of the
inheritance.
This specification must be qualified by controlling for the claimant’s residence choice ri j
and other observed claimant-specific factors Xij that might impact bequest preferences. Xij
consists of claimant-specific characteristics such as age at the time of inheritance, education
and wife’s education. Also included are dummy variables that indicate whether or not the
claimant is a farmer and if the claimant’s wife works outside the home. Yj includes family
specific factors such as the head’s education , occupation as farmer and other demographic
characteristics. Finally, ξi j captures unobserved claimant specific factors such as diligence at
work or filial relationship with the head, and is assumed to be distributed normally with zero
mean.
One limitation of this specification is that dependent variables are not independent across
observations. Specifically, in a sample where a claimant is the unit of observation, the bequest
of one claimant is simply the residual share from the other claimants. Therefore, I separately
estimate equation (23) for first-born and other claimants since shares will not be correlated
in a sample that includes only first-born claimants. However, that approach does not use the
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information that claimant shares must add to one. Therefore, a second approach I try is to
estimate a multinomial logit model of the head’s choices in distribution of land to claimants.
I implement this model with only two claimants and seven choices that represent the share
of land bequeathed to one of the claimants. Due to small number of observations, I cannot
estimate a similar model for families with more than two claimants, or with more categories.
5.1.3 Results
The results from specification (23), where I test for the influence of family structure on received
bequest shares, are presented in Table 4. Coefficients from a Tobit estimation cannot be directly
interpreted as percentages. However, since the number of censored observations is small, I
expect that Tobit is a close approximation of OLS and interpret the coefficients in Table 4 as
percentages. Column I reports the results for all claimants within the household, and shows
that an additional son increases the claimant’s share of the land bequest by 1 percent. This
mirrors the cumulative increase in bequest share for the other claimants when they have an
additional son (1.2 percent). The opposite effects of relatively equal magnitude indicate that
heads bequeath land to claimants with more sons, and that grandsons from different claimants
are substitutes for each other. Column I also shows that a claimant’s birth order has a large
influence on the bequest share received by a claimant. A claimant increases his bequest share
by 8 percent with an improvement of one position in the birth order.13
Note that the claimant’s residence away from the head’s household does not seem to impact
his inheritance. While α3 and α4 are comparable to α1 and α2 in magnitude, the associated
standard errors are large and the coefficient cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
Hence, it is unlikely that claimants make fertility and residence choices concurrently in order
to receive a larger inheritance. From an econometric perspective, this suggests that the results
from a probit estimation of fertility choice in equation (5.3) should be similar to the joint
estimation of fertility and residence choice.14.
13A closer examination of claimant birth order effects is outside the current model, but could reflect greater
certainty about an older claimant’s fertility outcomes.
14This joint estimation is Appendix B
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Columns II and III repeat the estimation with subsamples of claimants who are first and
higher in the birth order, respectively. The coefficients for α1m and α4m are both positive and
significant, indicating that an additional son adds approximately 2 percent to a claimant’s be-
quest. Interestingly, heads seem to value the daughters of claimants with high birth order,
although not as much as sons.
The dataset does not report the value of land inherited. However, data on the value of
land purchased during the reporting period is available. I calculate the value of the bequest
distributed by the household head as Rs. 2.4 million, measured in 1999.15 Thus, a 2 percent
increase in bequest share suggests that the value of an additional son is Rs. 47,000 to the
average claimant in the bequest dataset.
Table 5 reports the results of the multinomial logit estimation for two-claimant joint fami-
lies. Again, this specification incorporates the feature that bequest shares across claimants sum
to one. Additional sons help a claimant receive a greater share of land although the impact is
small. An additional son can help break an equal division tie so that a claimant receives be-
tween 0.5 and 0.55 percent of the bequest share, but does not help a claimant to receive larger
shares of the bequest. While these results support the strategic bequest hypothesis and are in
line with the estimates presented in the tobit specification, the small number of observations in
each category implies that they should be interpreted with caution.
These results establish that the number of own and other claimants sons are important fac-
tors determining the bequest received by the claimant. Thus, claimants have an important
incentive to maximize the number of sons they have if they live in a joint family where the head
is still alive and owns land.
15Rs. 43.19 = US$ 1 on 07/07/08.
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5.2 Strategic fertility
5.2.1 Data
Each observation in the fertility dataset consists of a man who is older than 15 years of age.
Each adult man is counted as one among multiple claimants in a joint family where the head is
still alive, as the sole claimant in a stem family where the head is still alive, or else as the head
of a nuclear family in an independent household.
The man’s wife answers questions on her fertility history, which allows me to create a
retrospective panel dataset. Schultz (1972) reports that recalled data on pre and post natal child
mortality is more reliable closer to the survey period.16 Therefore, the sample is restricted to
the 1992-98 time period which leaves 43,612 claimant-family-year observations in the panel
from 5,090 families over seven years.
Claimants might live within the household occupied by the joint family head or set up an
independent household. ri ∈ {0, 1} represents the claimant’s residence within or outside the
head’s household respectively. In the survey, multiple household heads who originated from a
single household in the 1981-82 wave might either be independent family heads or claimants
in a joint family. This status is based on the circumstances of departure and household division
as reported in the REDS dataset. Sons who become household heads after their father’s death
are categorized as independent heads, whereas those who split before their father’s death are
categorized as part of the joint family till the head dies. Consistent with observed bequest
behavior, split off sons retain status as claimants in their father’s household.
With this assignment, the fertility dataset has 16,162 observations as nuclear families, 7,912
observations in stem families and 19,538 observations in joint families. Table 2 reports the
number of claimants in each family type by year. The numbers change over time due to two
reasons. First, the sample grows as new claimants attain 15 years of age. Second, the number
16Recalled fertility data suffers from bias from two main sources (Schultz 1972). The primary reason is that
events in the distant past are reported less frequently than events in the recent past. The secondary reason is
that women who are reside in the household in the distant past might be different from those who reside in the
household in the recent past. Maternal mortality is a significant factor in the high death rate among adult women
in South Asia. Therefore, the mortality rate is higher among more fertile women, leading to non-random sample
selection if we survey only women who are alive in 1998-99.
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of joint families decreases and the number of independent families increases as heads die and
claimants form their own independent families as a result. I assumer that both these events
occur exogenously.
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the fertility dataset. Independent couples have on
average more children (3.21) than claimants in joint families (2.07). This might reflect the fact
that independent heads are older, with average age 43.3 years, compared to claimants in stem
(27.6 years) and joint families (31.5 years) and are therefore more likely to have completed
their fertility. An important feature of joint families is the significantly worse sex ratio. The
ratio of girls to boys is 0.816 in joint families, 0.883 in stem families and 0.969 in independent
families. Thus, the data suggests that survival of girls is worse in joint families compared to
other family types.17.
5.3 Within-family fertility
5.3.1 Specification
In this section, I test whether the probability that a claimant in a joint family tries to have another
child is positively impacted by the number of boys that the other claimants have, corresponding
to the theoretical prediction in equation (17). The other claimants’ daughters are neither future
heirs in the family lineage, nor direct economic costs or benefits to the claimant. Hence, they
ought not to have a large or significant impact on claimant’s own fertility. To test these two
propositions, I specify a probit model with a binary outcome θ that is 1 if a claimant i in joint
family j reports a pregnancy in year t.
θi jt =

0 if θ∗i jt ≤ 0
1 if 0 < θ∗i jt
(25)
17Differences in schooling in Table 3 are consistent with younger couples as claimants in joint families, and
relatively older couples as independent heads since formal education has expanded considerably in India over the
past few decades (The PROBE Team 1999).
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Here, θ∗i jt is a latent variable such that
θ∗i jt = β0 +β1ni jt +β2
∑
k,i
nk jt +β3Xi jt +β4Vi j +β5ri jt ∗ni jt +β6ri jt ∗
∑
k,i
nk jt +yeart +µ j + i jt (26)
where ni = [mi fi]′, β1 = [β1m β1 f ], β2 = [β2m β2 f ], β5 = [β5m β5 f ] and β6 = [β6m β6 f ].
In this model, the claimant reports a pregnancy based on the number of sons and daughters
(ni jt) he already has. I expect a negative relationship between the number of children and the
probability that the claimant will try for one more, i.e. β1m < 0 and β1 f < 0. Since sons
have value in the bequest game while daughters do not, equation (16) predicts that β1m < β1 f .
Strategic fertility is identified by the components of β2. In particular, equation (17) predicts that
β2m > 0 and is statistically significant, but β2 f is close to zero and not significant. β5 indicates
the impact of the claimant’s own sons and daughters if he is living in a split-off household. β6
indicates the impact of the other claimants sons and daughters when the claimant is split off.
One threat to this specification is from omitted variables that might impact fertility. There-
fore, I control for observable time-varying characteristics (Xi jt) of the claimant and his partner
that impact fertility, such as age, marital status and residence choice as well time-invariant
characteristics (Vi j) such as years of schooling, and participation in the formal work force. I
include year dummy variables to account for time-varying factors that impact fertility across all
claimants and families, such as availability of food due to variations in nation-wide monsoon
rainfall. i jt represents unobserved factors that might impact fertility, and is clustered at the
family level (µ j).
A possible shortcoming of this specification is that fertility decisions might be influenced
by factors that are specific to the joint family, rather than just the claimant. To check for this, I
exploit the panel aspect of the dataset and also specify a probit random effects model where
θ∗i jt = β0+β1ni jt+β2
∑
k,i
nk jt+β3Xi jt+β4Vi j+β5ri jt∗ni jt+β6ri jt∗
∑
k,i
nk jt+family jt+yeart+i jt (27)
In this specification, family jt is a random variable that captures possibly omitted joint family
characteristics that may be constant over time but vary between claimants, and others that may
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be fixed between claimants but vary over time. The parameters of interest are the same as
equation (25).
5.3.2 Results
Table 6 presents the results of the within-family test of strategic fertility specified in section
5.3. In the within-family test, the strategic fertility model predicts that the number of other
claimants’ boys has a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of reporting a pregnancy,
i.e. β2m > 0. Simultaneously, the other claimants’ girls should have a small and statistically
insignificant impact on the claimant’s fertility, i.e. β2 f is small. Column I reports marginal-
effects probit estimates from the specification in equation (25). As expected, the number of
own sons and daughters has a large, negative and statistically significant impact on a claimant’s
fertility. The probability of the claimant’s fertility decreases by 6.5 percent with an additional
son, and by 2.2 percent with an additional daughter. In contrast, an additional son for the other
claimants increases the probability of a pregnancy by 0.85 percent in a year, a result that is
significant at the 1 percent level. The other claimants’ daughters have a small impact on the
claimant’s fertility (0.5 percent) that is statistically indistinguishable from the null. This result
establishes the basic validity of the strategic fertility hypothesis.
I also examine whether fertility is impacted by moving away from the head’s household be-
fore his death. The coefficients on the interacted variables in Column I show that moving away
has a small impact on own fertility and no particular impact on strategic fertility. The decrease
in the probability that a claimant has another child in response to another son changes from 6.5
percent for all claimants to 4.6 percent for those who have formed separate households, perhaps
due to greater need for sons for agricultural labor or other household activities. In contrast, the
impact of own daughters is the same for split-off claimants as co-resident claimants. Notably,
there is almost no marginal influence (0.1 percent) of splitting on the marginal fertility impact
of the other claimants’ sons.
Column II in Table 6 reports the results of the random effects probit model specified in
equation (27). The results from this model are not much different from those in Column I,
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though they suggest a possible role for own sons in reducing fertility after the claimant has
split away from the head’s household.18 In addition, the other claimants’ daughters seem to
be statistically different from the null at the 10 percent level. However, since the associated
point estimate is smaller than the impact of either own children or the other claimants’ sons,
the validity of the strategic fertility hypothesis is maintained.
Table 7 presents the estimates for the marginal effect on own fertility while fixing the other
claimants’ sons. The first row of coefficients indicates that the value of an additional son for
a claimant is larger when the other claimants have more sons, than when the other claimants
have fewer sons. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that gain in bequest share is
greater when the other claimants have more sons than when they have fewer sons.
The third row of coefficients in Table 7 confirms the earlier result that a claimant is more
likely to report a pregnancy when the other claimants have more sons. I cannot conclude that
this result is driven by any particular number of other claimants’ sons although the effect is
greater when the other claimants have more sons confirming the theoretical prediction in the
previous paragraph.
5.4 Land ownership
5.4.1 Specification
This test uses Bernheim, Shleifer and Summer’s (1985) prediction that the strategic bequest
game is impacted by the size of the bequest. Correspondingly, I test whether strategic fertility
is influenced by the presence of a bequest. If the head of a joint family owns no land that he can
bequeath, then claimants have no incentive for strategic fertility. In this case, neither the other
claimants’ sons nor daughter will be significant in the claimants’ fertility decision. Indexing
l ∈ [0, 1], I estimate the following probit model where the model in equations (25) and (26) is
interacted with land ownership.
18Note that the coefficients in Column II are different from Column I since this column reports probit, not
marginal effects probit results.
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θi jt =

0 if θ∗i jt ≤ 0
1 if 0 < θ∗i jt
(28)
Here, θ∗i jt is a latent variable such that
θ∗i jt =
∑
l
γl0 ∗ Il +
∑
l
γl1(I
l ∗ ni jt) +
∑
l
γl2(I
l ∗
∑
k,i
nk jt) +
∑
l
γl3(I
l ∗ Xi jt) +
∑
l
γl4(I
l ∗ Vi j)
+
∑
l
γl5(I
l ∗ ri jt ∗ ni jt) +
∑
l
γl6(I
l ∗ ri jt ∗
∑
k,i
nk jt) +
∑
l
(Il ∗ yeart) + i jt (29)
where γl1 = [γ
l
1m γ
l
1 f ], γ
l
2 = [γ
l
2m γ
l
2 f ], γ
l
5 = [γ
l
5m γ
l
5 f ], γ
l
6 = [γ
l
6m γ
l
6 f ]. I
l is an indicator
variable such that I0 = 1 if the head does not own any land and I1 = 1 if the head owns land.
The parameters of interest are γ02m, γ
0
2 f , γ
1
2m and γ
1
2 f . If strategic fertility is salient only when
the head has land that can be bequeathed but not otherwise, then I expect that γ12m > 0 and
significant but γ02m is close to zero and not significant. γ
0
2 f and γ
1
2 f should both be close to zero
and insignificant. As in the previous section, I also estimate a probit model with family random
effects and report those results.
5.4.2 Results
Table 8 presents the results of the test of strategic fertility specified in section 5.4. Column I
reports results from marginal effects probit, and Column II from random effects probit models
respectively. In each column, the set of coefficients under ‘A’ represent claimants in joint
families where the head does not own any land. The coefficients under ‘B’ represent claimants
in joint families with a land-owning head.
The basic result corresponding to specification (28) as well as the random effect version is
that while the claimant’s own family structure is a statistically significant determinant of fertil-
ity in joint families that do not own land, both own family structure as well as other claimants’
boys are significant in land-owning families. The point estimates imply that an additional son
for other claimants increases the fertility rate by 0.82 percent in land owning families. This
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estimate is close to the 0.85 percent increase in the fertility rate reported in section 5.3. The
same coefficient for landless families is larger, i.e., 2.3 percent. However, it is imprecisely esti-
mated, and cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. In addition, it suggests that there is
greater variation in the response of the claimant’s own fertility to other claimants’ sons when
the head does not own land than when he does. Thus, the results of this test support the no-
tion that strategic fertility is primarily a phenomenon among land-owning families, offering an
explanation why the sex ratio is relatively worse in such families.
5.5 Head’s death
5.5.1 Specification
The final test employs the death of the previous head during the period of our study as a natural
experiment to observe fertility behavior within the same family. Assuming that the head’s death
is not associated with fertility behavior, selection into the sample is random for the purposes
of this test. Within the sample, other claimants’ sons ought to positively impact a claimant’s
fertility only while the head is still alive and has not distributed the bequest. Once the head
dies and distributes the bequest, claimants have no further incentive for strategic fertility. The
following probit specification tests this proposition. This model interacts the specification in
equations (25) and (26) with an indicator variable d ∈ [0, 1] for the head’s death.
θi jt =

0 if θ∗i jt ≤ 0
1 if 0 < θ∗i jt
(30)
Here, θ∗i jt is a latent variable such that
θ∗i jt =
∑
d
γd0I
d +
∑
d
γd1(I
d ∗ ni jt) +
∑
d
γd2(I
d ∗
∑
k,i
nk jt)
+
∑
d
γd3(I
d ∗ Xi jt) +
∑
d
γd4(I
d ∗ Vi j) +
∑
d
(Id ∗ yeart) + µ j + i jt (31)
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where γl1 = [γ
l
1m γ
l
1 f ], γ
l
2 = [γ
l
2m γ
l
2 f ], γ
l
5 = [γ
l
5m γ
l
5 f ], γ
l
6 = [γ
l
6m γ
l
6 f ]. I
0 = 1 and I1 = 0 before
the head dies and I0 = 0 and I1 = 1 afterwards. The parameters of interest are γ02m, γ
0
2 f , γ
1
2m
and γ12 f . If strategic fertility is significant before the head’s death but not so afterwards, then
I expect that γ02m > 0 and significant while γ
1
2m is small and not significant. γ
0
2 f and γ
1
2 f ought
to be close to zero and insignificant since the other claimants’ daughters are not factors in the
claimant’s fertility decision.
5.5.2 Results
Section 5.5 specifies that a claimant’s fertility ought to be dependent on other claimants’ family
structure only before the head’s death and distribution of the bequest. Once the claimant has
received his bequest, he will no longer participate in the strategic fertility game. Table 9 reports
the results of this test from a marginal effects probit model. The coefficients under ‘A’ represent
the impact of family structure before the head’s death, and the coefficients in ‘B’ represent the
impact after the head’s death.
As expected, the claimant’s own sons and daughters cause large declines in fertility both
before and after the head’s death, although the result is significant only before the head’s death.
In addition, the other claimant’s sons have a positive and statistically significant impact on
own fertility before the head’s death. Unusually, the other claimants’ daughters have a negative
impact on fertility before the head’s death, although it is not clear why this is the case. The point
estimates imply that an additional own son decreases the probability of reporting a pregnancy
by 3.3 percent before the head’s death, but by 13.5 percent after the head’s death. One reason
for this large difference is that even controlling for age, the claimant is more likely to have
higher order births after head’s death, and thus the marginal reduction in the probability of an
additional pregnancy is greater. The most notable result in Table 9 is that additional son for
the other claimants increases fertility by 1.3 percent before the head’s death, an estimate that is
significant at the 5 percent level, but has virtually no impact following the head’s death. This
implies that claimants’ consider each others’ fertility only insofar that the head is alive and has
not yet distributed his land, but not so once the head dies and land division is complete.
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5.6 Implications of strategic fertility
The results from the previous sections confirm that land bequests in joint families motivate
strategic fertility behavior. This behavior implies that a claimant will stop having children
sooner when he has many boys rather than when he has many girls. However, as previously
discussed in Section 3.2, this result by itself does not guarantee differences in outcomes for girls
and boys. For this, I propose that the differences in fertility responses imply that the average
girl in the population lives in a family that has systematically more children than the average
boy. Thus, even without differences in parents’ behavior towards children of different gender or
in resource allocations, the average girl will receive smaller share of resources than the average
boy, explaining poorer outcomes.
To see this in the fertility dataset, I check whether the average girl indeed has more siblings
than the average boy. In the following equations, fi j and mi j is the number of sons and daughters
born to claimant i in family j. Correspondingly, si j is the number of siblings for any one of that
claimant’s children. s¯ f and s¯m represent the number of siblings for the average girl and boy
respectively.
s¯ f =
∑
i, j
(si j ∗ fi j)∑
i, j
fi j
and s¯m =
∑
i, j
(si j ∗ mi j)∑
i, j
mi j
(32)
The excess number of siblings for the average girl is s¯ f − s¯m. I expect this to be positive,
and larger for joint families with multiple claimants than for stem families that have similar
observed characteristics (see Table 3), but only a single claimant and hence no strategic fertility.
Table 11 calculates the sibling statistics for stem and joint families. The number of siblings
for the average girl (s¯ f ) in a joint family is 2.761 whereas the number of siblings for the average
boy in a joint family is 2.481. Hence, the average girl has 0.280 excess siblings compared to
the average boy in joint families. Contrast this with 0.156 excess siblings for the average girl
in stem families.
The difference in the excess siblings between stem and joint families is driven by fewer
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number of siblings for the average boy in a joint family. The number of siblings for the average
girl in a stem family (2.757) is close to the number of siblings for the average girl in a joint
family (2.761). However, the difference in the number of siblings for the average boy in a stem
family (2.600) and the number of siblings for the average boy in a joint family (2.481) is large.19
This is consistent with the theory presented in Section 3 that predicts that a joint family with
many boys is more likely to observe declines in fertility compared to similar stem families, or
families with many girls in either family type.
Thus, the results in this section confirm that girls born in joint families live in households
that are systematically larger than where boys are born. The comparison with stem families
suggests that this is driven by the specific strategic fertility behavior observed in joint families.
6 Discussion
This paper demonstrated a mechanism by which bequest behavior in land-owning joint families
in rural India impacts gender differences in health and survival outcomes. The theoretical
model showed that in a patrilocal society, heads will prefer to bequeath land to claimants with
more sons in order to preserve land within the family in future generations. This motivates a
race for boys among claimants, manifested by strategic fertility, leading to family structures
where the average girl has more siblings than the average boy. Even without intra-household
differences in allocation, this result implies fewer resources for the average girl. Thus, fairly
benign behavior that manifests itself in differential stopping rules has the potential to explain
large and near universal differences in outcomes more effectively than sex-selective foeticide
and infanticide.
I test both the strategic bequest and strategic fertility hypotheses. I confirm that heads prefer
claimants with more sons, and as a result claimants’ fertility behavior responds strategically
to the family structures of the other claimants. As expected, this result is more pronounced
19Note that the excess siblings for the average girl is not a trivial outcome of a sex ratio skewed against girls. If
girls and boys are randomly assigned to households, then the average girl will have the same number of siblings
as the average boy regardless of the sex ratio.
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in land owning families relative to landless families, offering a possible explanation why sex
differences are larger in relatively prosperous families. Strategic fertility is also salient before
the head’s death and distribution of the bequest, compared to families where the inheritance has
been received. Although estimating the precise impact of this behavior within joint families on
sex differences in health and survival outcomes awaits advances in data collection, these results
provide a comprehensive explanation why such differences are greater in joint families than
other family structures.
The results should be read with two caveats. First, strategic fertility does not rule out
overtly discriminatory behavior by claimants against girls. Bequests might motivate significant
foeticide, infanticide or differences in resource allocation that I do not estimate in the empirical
analysis. For example, Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2009) report that mothers shorten the
time between pregnancies after a daughter’s birth compared to a son’s, resulting in a lower
breastfeeding and poorer lifelong health outcomes, a result that is entirely consistent with the
model presented in this paper. Moreover, sex bias might be motivated for reasons other than
bequests, such as the asymmetric labor market and cultural returns mentioned earlier. The
impact of strategic bequests and fertility are congruent to these reasons, not in opposition to
them.
Second, my model relies explicitly on the value of land as a permanent agricultural asset
as well as the social institution of women leaving their parents’ family at the time of marriage.
Therefore, I do not address gender differences in societies where land is not central to the
production process, or that have alternative types of social institutions.
The model presented in this paper makes a number of assumptions and simplifications due
to constraints in the data. The most salient assumptions were to ignore farm production, labor
supply, consumption, savings and marriage decisions that are also part of the economics of
the joint family household. This has two major implications. First, I cannot comment on the
dynamics of fertility behavior in independent households that do not have adult claimants, and
hence different sets of labor force participation and consumption decisions than stem and joint
family households. Second, I cannot perform simulations that predict the impact of specific
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policies that seek to redress gender differences in outcomes if those policies are also expected
to alter other household decisions.
Relaxing these assumptions requires the development of a full-scale model of intra-family
bargaining with forward-looking agents that extends two-agent bargaining models such as those
developed by Chiappori (1992), Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Friedberg and Stern (2007) to
a more elaborate family structure. Estimation of all the structural parameters of such a model
would be greatly aided by advances in data collection, particularly the allocation of resources
within the household. However, elements of the full-scale model can be tested using reduced
form techniques and available time use data. For example, the value of a son as a future heir
might imply that the birth of a boy increases consumption of leisure for a claimant and his wife.
From the perspective of marriage, the status of daughters as residual claimants who inherit land
only when the head has no sons implies that women with no brothers would be attractive in the
matrimonial market.
From a policy perspective, the results underscore the influence of differential bequest be-
havior on even apparently benign fertility behavior. Legal changes in the 1980s and 90s in a
number of southern Indian states granted daughters inheritance rights to agricultural land if the
head dies without a will. Since then, these states have been at the forefront of large advances
in female survival and health. A recent amendment to the Hindu Succession Act (2005) ex-
tended these rights nationally. This ought to increase the bargaining power of daughters in the
bequest game as they are regarded as claimants in their own right. Finally, land ownership is
a key driver of strategic fertility behavior, which suggests that the shift towards other forms of
bequests, such as investments in professional education, might alleviate an important cause of
differential gender outcomes.
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Appendices
A Intra-household allocation
Suppose η(m) represents the distribution of power across different claimants in the joint family
such that
∑
i ηi(m) = 1. If the birth of a son increases a claimant’s power within the joint family,
then ∂η(m)
∂mi
> 0. Thus, in a collective model of efficient intra-household allocation of private and
public goods, the household head faces the following optimization problem.
max
µ1,...,µN ,z
∑
i
ηi(m)ui(µiX, z) (33)
such that z +
∑
i
µixi = I and
∑
i
µi = 1 (34)
Then the first order conditions yield
ηi(m)
∂ui
∂µi
= η−i(m)
∂u−i
∂µ−i
(35)
or
ηi(m)
η−i(m)
=
MU−i
MUi
(36)
Assuming that claimants exhibit declining marginal utility in consumption of private goods, this
condition implies that an increase in ηi(m) due to the birth of a son will result in an increase in
the allocation µi for the claimant, or
∂µi
∂mi
≥ 0, ∂µi
∂m−i
≤ 0 (37)
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B Endogenous residence choice
One concern with the tests of strategic fertility presented in section 5.2 is the possibly endoge-
nous determination of residence choice with fertility. As outlined in Section 2.2, claimants
are more likely to leave the joint family’s household either when public good provision or the
possible share in bequest share declines. The results in Section 5.1.3 suggest that a claimant’s
residence does not significantly impact his share of the bequest. I check this result by estimat-
ing a bivariate normal probit model for the within-family test. The parameters of interest and
associated theoretical predictions are the same as in equation (25) respectively.
Column I in table 10 reports the results from joint determination of fertility and residence
choice in the within family test presented in section 5.3. Column II reports the results from
joint determination of fertility and residence choice in the land ownership test (section 28),
with coefficients under ‘A’ representing claimants in joint families where the head does not
own any land and coefficients under ‘B’ representing claimants in joint families with a land-
owning head.
The results from this model are not materially different from those in reported in Table 6,
confirming that residence choice is not a significant factor in the strategic fertility game.
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Figure 1: Importance of land vs. Sex ratio
Source: Govt. of India (1998) and Census of India (2001).
Figure 2: Agricultural income vs. Sex ratio
Source: Govt. of India (1998) and Census of India (2001).
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Bequests dataset
Mean (or percent) Std. dev.
Number of heads 464
Head’s schooling 1.2 years 2.561
Hindu 90.5% 0.29
Brahmin 9.2% 0.29
Other Upper Caste 30.4% 0.46
Scheduled Caste 8.1% 0.27
Claimants per head 2.73 0.97
Claimant’s characteristics
Number of claimants 1,266
Age 33.9 years 9.8
Size of land inherited 1.50 hectares 1.66
Number of sons 1.1 1.2
Number of daughters 0.9 1.2
Split from head’s household 24.2% 0.4
Married 94.6% 0.23
Claimant’s schooling 5.8 years 4.9
Wife’s schooling 2.9 years 3.9
Occupation as farmer 72.3% 0.45
Wife works outside home 30.6% 0.73
Notes: Variables as reported at time of inheritance. Head’s characteristics not available since survey data collected
after head’s death. Source: REDS 1998-99.
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Table 2: Claimants in fertility dataset
Year Independent Stem Joint Total
1992 2,120 1,092 2,934 6,146
1993 2,169 1,115 2,928 6,212
1994 2,227 1,126 2,877 6,230
1995 2,310 1,142 2,800 6,252
1996 2,385 1,145 2,726 6,256
1997 2,453 1,150 2,655 6,258
1998 2,498 1,142 2,618 6,258
Total 16,162 7,912 19,538 43,612
Share of Total 37.1% 18.1% 44.8% 100%
Source: REDS 1998-99.
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Table 3: Summary statistics: Fertility dataset
Independent Stem Joint Total
N (claimant-family-year) 16,162 7,912 19,538 43,612
Age 43.3 years 27.6 years 31.5 years 35.4 years
(12.4) (7.6) (8.9) (12.0)
Boys per claimant 1.63 1.00 1.14 1.30
(1.21) (1.18) (1.15) (1.21)
Girls per claimant 1.58 0.88 0.93 1.17
(1.39) (1.14) (1.13) (1.28)
Total children 3.21 1.88 2.07 2.47
(1.87) (1.87) (1.77) (1.92)
Sex ratio (girls/boys) 0.97 0.88 0.82 0.90
Other claimants’ boys 1.98
(2.30)
Other claimants’ girls 1.61
(2.04)
Split from head’s household 28%
(0.45)
Married 86% 78% 83% 83%
(0.34) (0.42) (0.38) (0.37)
Claimant’s schooling 5.5 years 7.1 years 6.8 years 6.4 years
(4.48) (4.93) (4.91) (4.95)
Age at headship 32.0 years
(10.15)
Woman working outside 35% 29% 27% 30%
(0.64) (0.63) (0.53) (0.59)
Woman’s schooling 3.1 years 4.7 years 3.8 years 3.7 years
(4.15) (4.73) (4.41) (4.42)
Hindu 90.3% 87.9% 89.0% 89.3%
(0.30) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31)
Brahmin 7.1% 6.8% 9.4% 8.1%
(0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.27)
Other Upper Caste 25.8% 28.6% 29.1% 27.8%
(0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (.45)
Scheduled Caste 13.3% 11.8% 10.9% 11.9%
(0.34) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32)
Note: Value in parentheses is standard deviation. Source: REDS 1998-99.
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Table
4:Strategic
bequestresults
D
ependentvariable:Share
ofland
(I)
(II)
(III)
C
oeff.
Std.E
rr.
C
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Std.E
rr.
C
oeff.
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N
um
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**
(0.005)
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***
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***
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(0.003)
-0.021
***
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7
N
otes:D
ouble
censored
random
effects
tobitm
odel.Standard
errors
are
clustered
atjointfam
ily
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46
Ta
bl
e
5:
M
ul
tin
om
ia
ll
og
it
re
su
lts
of
te
st
of
st
ra
te
gi
c
be
qu
es
t
C
at
eg
or
y
(S
ha
re
of
L
an
d)
0
to
0.
25
0.
25
to
0.
40
0.
40
to
0.
50
0.
50
to
0.
60
0.
60
to
0.
75
0.
75
to
1
N
um
be
ro
fo
w
n
so
ns
0.
60
1
*
1.
02
0
*
-0
.8
79
*
1.
28
5
**
0.
07
3
-0
.4
85
(0
.3
2)
(0
.5
9)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.5
4)
(0
.5
2)
(0
.3
8)
N
um
be
ro
fo
w
n
da
ug
ht
er
s
-0
.0
38
-0
.0
53
0.
13
1
-0
.8
58
-2
.2
76
-0
.0
49
(0
.3
5)
(0
.4
7)
(0
.3
3)
(0
.6
2)
(1
.4
0)
(0
.3
8)
O
th
er
cl
ai
m
an
t’s
so
ns
-0
.4
53
0.
54
7
0.
35
6
-2
.8
86
**
*
0.
76
9
*
0.
12
9
(0
.3
4)
(0
.5
3)
(0
.2
8)
(1
.0
3)
(0
.4
6)
(0
.3
0)
O
th
er
cl
ai
m
an
t’s
da
ug
ht
er
s
0.
01
2
-0
.6
14
0.
39
9
1.
38
0
**
-2
.1
06
*
-0
.0
58
(0
.3
3)
(0
.7
4)
(0
.3
4)
(0
.5
8)
(1
.2
4)
(0
.3
8)
C
la
im
an
t’s
ag
e
-0
.0
06
0.
06
5
0.
07
1
-0
.0
54
-0
.1
08
-0
.0
55
(0
.0
5)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
6)
O
th
er
cl
ai
m
an
t’s
ag
e
0.
03
5
-0
.0
89
-0
.0
97
*
0.
15
1
0.
05
6
0.
02
5
(0
.0
6)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
6)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.0
7)
(0
.0
6)
B
ir
th
or
de
r
-0
.1
32
-1
.5
91
0.
59
1
0.
44
5
-0
.4
61
-1
.0
96
(1
.0
2)
(2
.6
4)
(1
.1
3)
(1
.6
9)
(1
.4
3)
(1
.1
0)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
in
ca
te
go
ry
12
6
15
10
11
14
N
ot
es
:
Sh
ar
e
of
L
an
d
=
0.
50
is
th
e
ba
se
ou
tc
om
e.
**
*
in
di
ca
te
s
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
le
ve
l.
**
in
di
ca
te
s
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
5%
le
ve
l.
*
in
di
ca
te
s
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
10
%
le
ve
l.
So
ur
ce
:R
E
D
S
19
98
-9
9.
47
Table 6: Results of test of strategic fertility within joint families
Dependent variable: Reported pregnancy
I: Probit II: Probit random
marginal effects effects coefficients
Number of own sons - 0.065 *** - 0.339 ***
(0.007) (0.026)
Number of own daughters - 0.022 *** - 0.130 ***
(0.005) (0.025)
Other claimants’ sons 0.008 *** 0.040 ***
(0.003) (0.013)
Other claimants’ daughters - 0.005 - 0.028 *
(0.003) (0.016)
Number of own sons * Split - 0.046 * -0.240 ***
(0.026) (0.091)
Number of own daughters * Split - 0.020 - 0.098
(0.017) (0.071)
Other claimants’ sons * Split - 0.001 0.006
(0.009) (0.043)
Other claimants’ daughters * Split 0.015 0.071
(0.010) (0.048)
Constant - 0.124
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at joint family level. *** indicates
coefficients are significant at 1% level. * indicates coefficients are significant at 10% level. N = 7,522 in 599 joint
families. Source: REDS 1998-99.
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8:Strategic
fertility
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(0.027)
N
um
berofdaughters
-0.021
-0.022
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***
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(0.005)
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(0.025)
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ants’sons
0.023
0.008
***
0.110
0.039
***
(0.021)
(0.003)
(0.113)
(0.013)
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-0.003
-0.004
-0.051
-0.026
(0.022)
(0.004)
(0.197)
(0.016)
N
um
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*
Split
0.027
-0.057
**
0.104
-0.291
***
(0.053)
(0.026)
(0.278)
(0.101)
N
um
berofdaughters
*
Split
-0.041
-0.022
-0.236
-0.103
(0.062)
(0.019)
(0.292)
(0.076)
O
therclaim
ants’sons
*
Split
0.006
-0.001
0.045
0.004
(0.024)
(0.009)
(0.184)
(0.047)
O
therclaim
ants’daughters
*
Split
-0.015
0.017
-0.035
0.082
(0.042)
(0.011)
(0.271)
(0.052)
C
onstant
-0.145
N
otes:
V
alues
in
parentheses
are
standard
errors.
Standard
errors
are
clustered
at
joint
fam
ily
level.
***
indicates
coeffi
cients
significant
at
1%
level.
**
indicates
coeffi
cients
significantat5%
level.N
=
7,522
in
599
jointfam
ilies.Source:R
E
D
S
1998-99.
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Table 9: Strategic fertility before and after head’s death
Dependent variable: Reported pregnancy
A: Before B: After
head’s death head’s death
Number of own sons - 0.033 ** - 0.135
(0.017) (0.272)
Number of own daughters - 0.022 ** - 0.519
(0.012) (0.481)
Other claimants’ sons 0.013 ** 0.006
(0.005) (0.031)
Other claimants’ daughters - 0.013 ** - 0.078
(0.007) (0.063)
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at joint family level. ** indicates
coefficients are significant at 5% level. N = 768 in 125 joint families. Source: REDS 1998-99.
Table 10: Bivariate probit estimation
Dependent variable: Reported pregnancy and residence
I: Within II: Land
family test ownership test
A: Landless B: Land
head owning head
Number of own sons - 0.333 *** - 0.365 ** - 0.331 ***
(0.033) (0.155) (0.034)
Number of own daughters - 0.113 *** - 0.139 -0.114 ***
(0.024) (0.128) (0.024)
Other claimants’ sons 0.038 *** 0.083 0.038 ***
(0.013) (0.067) (0.013)
Other claimants’ daughters - 0.016 - 0.022 - 0.015
(0.016) (0.075) (0.016)
Constant - 1.166 -0.214
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at joint family level. *** indicates
coefficients are significant at 1% level. ** indicates coefficients are significant at 5% level. N = 7,522 in 599 joint
families. Source: REDS 1998-99.
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1998-99.
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